


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T O

ROBERT CLERK, Esq;

LIEUTENANT GENERAL of
His MAJESTY'S FORCES.

S I R,

IN the course of our acquaintance, we, or rather you, have discussed, almost every point of military knowledge. If there is any thing worthy the attention of the soldier in the following discourse, I owe it to you: it is therefore just I should acknowledge the source from whence it sprung; accordingly I inscribe it to you, and at the same time

thank

DEDICATION.

thank you for the many favors you
have conferred upon me. I have
the honor to be with the highest
esteem and respect,

S I R,

Your most grateful,

Humble Servant,

G. L.

A
R H A P S O D Y
O N
FRENCH POLITICS, &c.

IT is impossible to calculate, with any degree of probability, the duration and event of a war, unless we are acquainted with the political system, principles of government, and resources of the contending powers. I shall, therefore, give a short view of them, which will enable the Reader to form some judgment of the present state of affairs.

C H A P. I.

WHILE the House of Austria was all-powerful in Europe, and possessed of many provinces on the west side of the Rhine, now united

B ed

ed to France, it was evident that the French nation could have no other permanent system of politics, but that which tended to reduce that House within narrower bounds, particularly in the Low Countries, and towards the Rhine. Accordingly, we find France continually employed in raising disturbances in Germany, Italy, Spain, &c. and exciting the different powers of Europe and Turkey against Austria, Richelieu having reduced the Hugonots, took an active part at the latter end of the war, which had been maintained in Germany for near thirty years; and by the treaty of Westphalia, the French, as one of the guarantees, obtained a right to interfere in the affairs of Germany, of which they have availed themselves on every occasion to embarrass the House of Austria. More than once, they brought her to the brink of destruction, and had it not been for the powerful support and assistance of the
maritime

maritime powers, particularly of England, she must have fallen a victim to the ambition of France. Those powers who feared Austria, very naturally looked up to France for protection, and increased her strength by the addition of their forces.

During the minority of Lewis XIV. the administration of Mazarine was almost totally confined to domestic occurrences, which were sufficiently embarrassing to occupy his whole attention.

Lewis XIV. on taking the reins of government, pursued the system of his predecessors with regard to Austria. Having, in the beginning of his reign, met with great success in war, and added some provinces to his crown, he became ambitious, from that principle, rather than from necessity, (for he was already sufficiently powerful to have nothing to fear from Austria) Lewis did

not cease to embroil Europe, almost during his whole reign. In the course of his wars, he found himself checked, chiefly by the maritime powers; England was out of his reach; without ships of war nothing could be done against her. Seconded by able ministers, in a few years, to the astonishment of all the world, he raised a powerful fleet, and, for a little time, maintained a superiority at sea, of which he availed himself in an attempt to reinstate James II. on the throne of England, but without success. The confederacy formed against the French monarch on the continent became so powerful, particularly towards the close of his reign, that the whole force of his kingdom was scarce sufficient to resist the progress of the allied armies. The marine was of course abandoned, and sunk nearly into the insignificant state in which he found it. Soon after Lewis XV. had mounted the French throne, Cardinal Fleury became
prime

prime minister ; happily for France, who wanted peace to recover from the innumerable losses which the ambition of Lewis XIV. had brought upon her. This prelate, from principle, as well as temper, pursued invariably a pacific system ; the wars excited by the turbulent spirit of Alberoni for the kingdom of Naples, and that on the *Rhine*, occasioned by the *pretensions* of Augustus II. to the throne of Poland, were transitory, and of very short duration. The House of Austria having imprudently engaged in that quarrel, Fleury availed himself of her distressful situation, to tear Lorraine from her, which connected and completed the French frontier on the German side.

On the death of Charles VI. a new and general war broke out in Germany, wherein the maritime powers engaged also. Cardinal Fleury wished to keep France neuter, believing either that Au-
stria

Austria would find sufficient employment from the several Princes who formed pretensions to the Emperor's succession ; and that by remaining neuter, the French might mediate and dictate the terms of peace, without partaking of the dangers and expences of the war : Or, perhaps, judging that France, recovered from her losses, and strengthened by her new acquisitions, would always be a match for Austria hereafter, whatever might be the event of the war. The cardinal, however, was overruled, and a general confederacy was formed against the House of Austria, which tended to annihilate her entirely : Indeed the success did not answer the hopes and expectations of the confederates, and things remained in great part, as they were at the commencement of the war. The King of Prussia acquired Silesia, the King of Sardinia increased his possessions in Lombardy, and a settlement was procured for Don Philip, in the same country.

country. The French and Spanish trade suffered greatly in the course of this war; for the expences of the land armies in Germany and Italy were so excessive, that no effort could be made by these two powers to establish a marine; so that we remained entirely masters of the sea. Our trade and navigation increased, and furnished the means to pursue the war on the continent. France in the mean time, excited disturbances in Scotland, which soon were quelled; because, for want of a marine, she could not support them, had she really meant to do it.

The last war offers us a new system of politics adopted by the French, contrary and opposite to that which they had for many ages prosecuted. The House of Austria being no longer an object of fear or jealousy, they engaged in a confederacy, calculated for her aggrandizement, at the expence of a

Prince whose alliance they had heretofore, and ought always to have courted. However formidable they might believe France to be, Austria had likewise increased in wealth, power, and, above all, her administration, in regard to finances, &c. was much improved. It seemed, therefore, highly advantageous for the French that there should be Princes in Germany, able, in some degree, to check the power of Austria. Prussia was, of all others, the most proper to be opposed to her, as they had done it with success during the preceding war. There is no explaining a system so very contrary to the apparent interests of France, unless we suppose that court had an after-game to play, as circumstances might offer, during the course of the hostilities.

The French originally engaged to furnish only twenty-four thousand men, avowedly to deliver Saxony; and, if that
had

had been effected, 'tis probable they would have forced the contending parties to conclude such a peace as they approved of. They had a numerous army to enforce their mediation. I cannot think they intended seriously to promote in the least the greatness of their ancient rivals in power, and much less at the expence of Prussia, whom they will find a powerful and necessary ally, in case of any future war with the former. The negotiations at Teschen last year, and the part they acted there, evince that they are not real friends to the House of Austria.

By engaging partially in the war in Germany, it is probable the French thought they might direct their principal attention to their marine, and to the defence of their colonies. All their schemes were defeated by the extraordinary efforts of the King of Prussia, and the allied army. Their new-raised
fleet

fleet being beat and dispersed, our superiority at sea enabled us to overcome every obstacle; we conquered all we attacked, and reduced the House of Bourbon so low, that we might have prescribed any terms of peace. Unhappily we mistook entirely in the choice of our acquisitions, some of which, so far from being advantageous have been one of the principal causes that brought the present calamities upon us. We attend too much to the contracted, and very often selfish, views of the merchants; we act upon too narrow a scale, like traders, and seldom as a powerful nation. In forming treaties, a Minister should have the whole globe before his eyes, and by no means confine himself to this or that province, or branch of trade; these are not to be overlooked, but they must never serve as a foundation for a treaty, unless you mean to reduce the nation to a company of mercantile people. Towards the end of
the

the war the Duke of Choiseul became all-powerful in the French Ministry. He is a man of a bold, extensive, and enterprising genius. His country found in him the vastness of Richelieu, the activity of Louvois, the magnificence of Seignelay, the amiableness of Pomponne and they dismissed him. He projected and concluded the Family Compact, which unites the different branches of the House of Bourbon in the closest connection, and we now see the effects of that master-piece of politics.

The great losses that the French suffered during the last war, the imminent danger with which the taking of the Havannah, in particular, threatened the rest of the Spanish dominions in America, very naturally drew the whole attention of both nations to us. It was obvious that while we were superior at sea, notwithstanding the disproportion of our land forces, in any
future

future contest, their Colonies would always be exposed to the same danger, and if lost, might not always be restored at a peace. They have therefore attended to their marine alone; and have pursued this measure with such industry and activity, that a fleet has been raised by them which astonishes Europe, and must be very alarming to England. It is impossible to foresee how far success may correspond with their force or their ambition. Their views are great, and tend to reduce us within very narrow limits. That nothing should divert them from their main object, the French have, with the utmost care, avoided and prevented a German war, which might have engaged a part of their forces, and frustrate the general design against our country.

The present state of affairs enables us to resolve a political problem, often discussed.

cuffed within and without doors, *viz.* Whether continental connections are useful or otherwise to this nation? I need not recapitulate the arguments for and against them; suffice it to say, that while we paid allies on the continent, the attention of France was so intirely taken up in the different wars in Germany, that she could not raise a marine in any degree proportioned to ours; that we have constantly maintained a decisive superiority at sea, which increased the power, glory, and political influence of the nation, notwithstanding the immense sums which were sent abroad for such connections; that since we have abandoned the continental system, France has acquired an unlimited influence in the different courts of Europe; without anxiety on that side, she has been enabled to direct the whole force of the House of Bourbon against England alone, and God knows what may be the issue of this, I fear, unequal contest.

contest. Let us draw a veil over such an alarming prospect : Let every man exert himself to the utmost of his power for the service of his King and Country, that we may avert the storm which hangs over our heads, and baffle the efforts of our combined enemies.

Whoever considers the position of England, and of its Colonies, will perceive that our very existence depends on this circumstance alone, *viz.* that we should be superior at sea ; all our politics ought therefore to be directed to that object singly. Had we millions of armed men, equal in discipline to the Prussians, they can be of no use to defend our trade or Colonies ; and if we are reduced to defend England, all is over. Why has our fleet been neglected ? Why have the national funds been consumed and exhausted to multiply land forces, instead of being applied to raise a powerful fleet, which is the only force that can protect

protect us? It is impossible to explain this by any principle of reason; our militia alone are more than sufficient to repel any invaders, if our fleet be superior to theirs; and even the idea of an invasion in that case is absurd. Standing armies appear an useless burthen; and now, to our cost, they will be found totally inadequate to the defence of England and its Colonies.

Having abandoned continental connections, it became more than ever necessary to apply all our resources to the fleet. The question is by no means, whether it be equal or superior to what it was at any other period? I ask, why it is not superior to the fleet of the House of Bourbon? Does it arise from want of funds or men? Why do we not appropriate the sums employed in levying numberless corps, to build ships and raise twenty or thirty thousand marines? Why are not the new levies converted into
marines?

marines ? With proper encouragement this may be done, and unless it is done, we sink under the superior forces of the enemies.

Land forces are nothing. Marines are the only species of troops proper for this nation ; they alone can defend and protect it effectually. During the peace they garrison all your ports in each quarter of the globe ; in time of war your fleet is instantly manned ; and by employing many of them, fewer seamen are wanted in proportion. Besides, a fleet having on board twelve or fifteen thousand marines, is equal to almost any enterprize against the enemy's settlements, and keeps them in continual anxiety in every part of the world. By this means the expence and delays attending the embarkation of a considerable body of land forces, destined to attack the enemy, would be spared, and the success become more certain. Every
other

other method to prevent the final ruin of this country will be hurtful or ineffectual. *A powerful fleet and thirty thousand marines, I repeat it, will save us from destruction, and nothing else.*

C H A P. II.

Of the Force of Nations.

NO AUTHOR that I know of has given any data which can enable us to calculate the force of nations ; it is therefore with diffidence that I propose my ideas on the subject. I think that the power and strength of a nation depend on the number of its inhabitants and the quantity of their industry. This can be found and estimated only by the yearly revenues raised on the subject, which bear a given proportion to the yearly production of the whole nation. It is the revenue which enables the Sovereign to maintain fleets and armies. It is the number of inhabitants which furnishes men for the one and the other ; and in these I place the absolute force of a nation ; for its relative force will depend on position,

tion, quality of industry, strength of contiguous powers, military system, nature of the government, &c. which vary often in the course of a few years. It is therefore necessary we should attend only to the absolute force of nations, when we compare them with each other, in order to form a general scale, by which we measure their strength.

France contains above twenty millions of inhabitants: the yearly revenues of that kingdom amount to above sixteen millions sterling, five of which being appropriated to pay the interest of the national debt, eleven only will remain free, and according to our system, the absolute force of the French nation will be thirty-one.

Spain contains more than seven millions and a half of inhabitants in Europe, and above two in America, with

a yearly revenue of above five millions; so that her absolute force will amount to about fifteen. Consequently the absolute force of the House of Bourbon will be found equal to forty-six.

To this sum may be added that of our Revolted Colonies, which increases still the force united against us.

I wish that others, better informed than I am, would calculate the force of my own country upon this principle, and compare it with that of the House of Bourbon: though the contrast might appear very unfavourable to England, I don't doubt but her relative force compared also with that of her enemies, would make amends for the enormous disproportion in point of inhabitants and revenues.

C H A P. III.

Of the Analogy between the Form of Government and the State of War.

DESPOTISM acts with the rapidity of a torrent ; like it it leaves desolation and solitude behind, or it declines into a lethargy. In despotism there is no system ; its motions are instantaneous, and arise from trifles, or the caprice of a moment. They are extremely violent, but transitory. If you can resist, or more safely avoid, their first impetuosity, you will easily conquer in the end.

Monarchy, though not so violent and rapid in its motions, is sufficiently strong to collect and exert the national forces. When endowed with wisdom, it directs them, so that they procure the most

general and permanent advantages. It is like a majestic river, which, if kept within bounds, and its waters judiciously distributed, embellishes and enriches the country. But when Administration is too violent, this beneficent river becomes a torrent, and ruins the country: If weak, it branches out into a thousand small rivulets, which finally dwindle to nothing.

As in monarchies the whole power of the state is centered in one man, and the exercise of it depends upon his will alone, to prevent a sudden and capricious use of it, which in a short time might ruin the state, it ought to be a maxim established in this kind of government, that the administration should be confided to many people, that the departments should be separated, and that the council of state should be numerous, because the government of one man being naturally quick and violent, it
requires

requires a number of checks to prevent an improper use, or rather abuse, of such extensive powers.

As all military operations require vigour and constancy, it is evident that a monarchical government is singularly adapted to war. Different from despotism, regular plans and systems may be pursued, and the government is sufficiently strong to execute them with the necessary vigour. As the subjects are attached to the Sovereign chiefly by the idea of glory, they cheerfully concur with him in supporting an offensive war; if successful, their efforts increase, and therefore are not easily checked. Misfortunes, and consequently a defensive war, allay their courage. They soon perceive they do not fight for themselves, and feel only the miseries of the war, which they suppose is carried on to gratify the ambition and caprice of the sovereign, or of some favourite. Hence it is, that mo-

narchies in general are more adapted to an offensive than a defensive war.

Pursuing the metaphor adopted above, I will say that a republican government is like a great river, formed by a multiplicity of springs and rivulets, different in that from a despotic, or a monarchy, which arises from one alone. If the comparison be just, it follows, that in this kind of government there should be a sufficient force to collect and unite the different springs, and give the whole that *precise direction* which is most advantageous. A republican government however labours under this very great disadvantage: It is almost impossible to determine what degree of power ought to be vested in the executive part of the state, so that it should be sufficient to answer every purpose of government, and how to form such checks as may effectually prevent any abuse of that power to the danger of the state. Is it too much, liberty is gone; is it too little,

tle, anarchy ensues. The very long duration of the republic of Venice would induce one to conclude, that those wise republicans had resolved this very difficult problem.

The extreme difficulty of *collecting*, *uniting*, and *directing* the national forces in a republican government, shews that it is by no means calculated for war, and much less for an offensive one. Its principles being founded in equality, it is evident that war of every kind ought to be avoided, because it necessarily throws too much power into the hands of one or few men, which finally destroy the government. It is also from the want of unity and sufficient force to exert the powers of the state, that all confederacies, however formidable, have failed in their schemes, if the war has been of any duration. The famous league of Cambray, the leagues formed against France at different times, and against Austria; that against Prussia in the last war, and a hundred more,

were

were dissolved without producing any effect proportioned to their forces.

Republics, unless formed upon military principles, as was that of the Romans, are totally unfit for action. Nothing could unite the Greek republics against Persia, till the time of Alexander the Great, when they had nearly lost their liberty; but when attacked, what prodigious efforts did they not make for the common cause. It is certainly true, that republics, unless forced by the immediate sense of danger, never have that unanimity and vigour necessary to carry on a war with any probability of success, and therefore are proper only for a defensive war. There, indeed, their efforts increase in proportion to the danger with which they are threatened; and if the motives arise from civil or religious principles, they generally become invincible. When such motives disappear, and the sense of danger vanishes, each party pursues
its

its own interest, and the confederacy is dissolved.

I am so convinced of the truth of this reasoning, that I have not the least doubt, if we could hold New-York, Long Island, Rhode Island, and Philadelphia, and cease to make those fruitless and unmeaning excursions in the American woods, that the Congress and the rebel people, no longer united by the sense of fear, would soon dissolve their confederacy, and a more favourable opportunity would offer of restoring peace and union between them and the mother country. The troops employed on the American Continent might enable us to strike some capital stroke in the West Indies, which would constrain our enemies to bring a great part of their forces to that country ; for in the West Indies is their weak part, and there they may be attacked with advantage.

C H A P. IV.

Of the INVASION expected.

WHILE the terrors of an invasion and its consequences hang over our heads, it is the duty of every man to contribute with his person and advice to the support of the state, and point out the means which appear proper to defeat the designs of our enemies. With this view I have wrote the following discourse on the supposed invasion, and hope it may serve, in some measure, to render it fruitless, and inspire government, as well as the nation in general, with that confidence which the situation of our affairs require. Without confidence, his Majesty cannot avail himself, with any prospect of success, of the national forces.

The

The enemies, superior at sea, and moreover, having a land force sufficient for any purpose, may have three objects in view. The first and most capital would be to land a powerful army in England. If success should follow their operations, it is evident we must conclude a peace on any terms, and the war is soon brought to an end. This enterprize is decisive, and therefore preferable to any other.

Their next object might be to take possession of the Western provinces, and to maintain themselves there for a few months only, without making any further progress into the country; then our commerce would be totally intercepted, and our whole attention confined to the immediate defence of the state; so that our foreign settlements would, in a short time, fall of course into their hands. Such an expedition is very bold, but it is equally dangerous, and it might prove
fatal

fatal to their army. It is possible, therefore, that their shew and parade should be intended only to keep us at home, and ruin our trade, while, with the rest of their forces, they attack our colonies, Gibraltar, Minorca, &c.

Finally, to increase our distress, the combined enemies may land fifteen or twenty thousand men in the Bay of Galway, and cover themselves with the Shannon. The inhabitants of Connaught, equally poor and ignorant, might be induced to join them, and it would not be an easy matter to drive their army out of that country, if their fleet could support their army with provisions. Such a scheme offers all the advantages of *the* former, without being subject to the same difficulties as *the* second; the season being now far advanced, it is probable they may not think it eligible to attempt an invasion in England for the present, and next year we shall
be

be much better prepared to receive them. Perhaps they may then find it too dangerous an undertaking, and without adopting any of the two first plans we have supposed, they will attempt to land in Ireland, or only shew themselves in the Channel. However, as an invasion of England, with a powerful army, may be attended with fatal consequences, I shall confine my observations to that alone, and endeavour to shew how it may be frustrated.

The appearance and force of the combined fleet prove the intention of bringing affairs to a speedy conclusion, and had they met with us, and fought with success, I have not the least doubt they would have invaded this kingdom with a formidable number of troops. Every thing was then, and is now, prepared for that purpose: when I consider their immense superiority, and foresee the probable event of a battle,

battle, I cannot help applauding those councils which tended to avoid it, as well as the prudence with which they were followed. Time and delays, at this moment, and at this season of the year, are a victory. Had we beat the combined fleet, little more would have been attained, whereas the loss of a battle might have been fatal.

While our fleet is entire, though we may, for a time, be forced out of the sea, yet am I persuaded that no invasion can take place. It is always a dangerous enterprize, and not to be attempted while there remains a possibility of our appearing at sea ; which may happen from a thousand circumstances arising from wind and weather, in the winter especially, when the combined fleet must separate, and all communication with the army they may have landed must be cut off. Our fleet, in the mean time, may intercept their convoys, and block
up

up the harbour when they have established their *dépôts*; so that in a short time their troops must perish. It is not enough that they debark an army, it must be continually supplied and protected from France, otherwise, however numerous, it cannot make any progress or penetrate into the country.

If contrary to our hopes and expectations, the British Fleet is beat and drove into some harbour, and the enemy does land a powerful army, we must not despond, nor by groundless fears facilitate the success of the invaders; a just and entire confidence in government is necessary to our preservation, and the common danger should produce an union of all parties in the defence of their country. It is needless to trace the causes which have brought our affairs to this crisis; such a task would only tend to sow division and discontent, when concord and harmony are most
D required.

required. But I would beg leave to recommend to the stockholders not to be alarmed, and let their fears prevail over their reason. If, to secure their property, they draw on the bankers, and attempt at once to realize their securities, they will infallibly bring ruin and destruction on themselves and families. For though there be a sufficient sum to answer every purpose of trade and circulation, as well as to pay the interest allowed on such securities, successively as it becomes due, yet is there not in this, nor in any other country, money enough to pay off all the principals, and if it is attempted, a bankruptcy must ensue; the monied men are ruined, and the whole nation is thrown into a convulsion, which may prove incurable, particularly if the enemy is in the country. Whereas if they remain quiet, and repose a proper confidence in government, we shall, no doubt, be able to repel the danger which threatens us. The resources of this country

country are numerous, they are great, and when properly exerted, will enable us to overcome our enemies, however formidable, and force them to lay down their arms.

Though the frontier of a country, as is that of England, may be very extensive, and therefore seems very difficult to be defended; yet upon a due examination, it will be always found, that such a frontier can be attacked only in few points, and that these points are fixed and determined by the nature and position of the countries at war. An army, like a traveller, must necessarily depart from a given point, and proceed to a given point in the enemy's country. The line which unites these points, I call *the Line of Operation*. It is manifest that all deviation from this, and all delays in pursuing the march, are so much time lost; and in the end, will force an enemy to return either for want

of subsistence, or by bad weather, &c. To diminish the difficulties which oppose the progress of the main army on the Line of Operation, some times a corps is made to act on another line to create a diversion ; but such a corps can never produce a solid advantage, if you attend to the main point, and frustrate the designs of the principal army.

When the frontiers of the contending powers are contiguous, the magazines formed in the country which attacks may for some time supply the invading army, until by a victory it is enabled to take some capital fortress, and secure a tract of the enemy's country sufficient to form a new *dépôt* to support the whole, or a great part of the troops, during the winter. If this cannot be executed, it is evident the attacking army must, after a fruitless campaign, return to its own country. In proportion as an army advances into
the

the enemy's country, new *dépôts* must be continually formed, and these as near as possible; for when they are at any considerable distance, the convoys arrive slow, require strong escorts, and are so precarious, that the army can neither move nor act, especially if the country is close and the enemy active: let him give his whole attention to attack your communications, and he must live day and night on your Line of operation. In general commanders mistake the principles of a defensive war, and very absurdly endeavour to check and stop the progress of an enemy, by opposing him in front in some advantageous post, which method is, for the most part, ineffectual or dangerous. You are often forced to a general action, whose consequences may be fatal, as victory will enable your adversary to fix himself in some part of the country, from whence, the ensuing campaign, he begins his operations sooner, and with additional ad-

D 3

vantages.

vantages. This cannot be done if you avoid a general action, and employ the greatest part of your forces on his Line of operation, which is the only effectual and sure means to stop his progress; let him advance in front, the length of his line will weaken it, and offer your attacks certain and decisive success.

If the frontiers are not contiguous, and be separated by the territories of other Princes, by forests, deserts, mountains, and above all by the sea; it is clear, that so many difficulties will occur in such an undertaking, as that of an invasion, that it is almost impossible it should succeed.

An army which acts over a branch of the sea, must occupy some convenient and safe harbour; gain a great and decisive battle, or by skilful manœuvres force the enemy to abandon such a tract
of

of country as will, in a great measure, support the assailant ; for if he depends in the smallest degree on shipping, and a precarious navigation for supplies, he cannot prosecute any solid operation, and successive campaigns will be consumed in fruitless and unmeaning excursions ; troops must, however, return to the shore to take up their winter quarters, and at last his men and money being exhausted, he perishes totally, or abandons the enterprize with loss, and ignominy.

From hence it appears that an offensive war must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour and activity ; for nothing less than compleat victories can render it successful. Consequently a defensive war must be carried on with caution and prudence, and, above all things, a general action is to be avoided. You oppose the enemy in front by occupying strong posts, and with the remainder of

your forces you act on his flanks and rear ; which in a short time will reduce him, though much stronger, to fall back and approach his *dépôts*. If King Harold had followed this doctrine it is probable we should have known William the Conqueror by his defeat only.

Let us now apply the principles established above to the present case.

It is evident that Brest is the point from whence the French must depart ; because all their operations, even when they have landed, are connected with and depend upon their fleet. But, as all operations which depend on navigation are, from its nature, precarious, and liable to a thousand difficulties, they must have likewise a place of arms in this country, a spacious harbour, as near their own coast as possible, &c. and besides these advantages, absolutely required, the place must be so situated that

that by marching a few miles inland, they can occupy such a post as will render them masters of a tract of country behind their army sufficient to supply it with subsistence on their stops; without which no progress can be made, nor can they remain for any considerable time in any part of the country. The plan which offers these advantages is the most eligible of any they can fix upon.

Plymouth answers perfectly this description. It is a safe and convenient harbour, near the coast of France; and by marching only to Chudleigh, the invaders will be masters of Cornwall, Devonshire, and part of Somersetshire, where they can find provisions in abundance; which will enable them to prosecute their operations and penetrate further into the country, or, if they chuse to remain there, it would be a difficult matter to drive them back, as they
would

would have a fleet at Plymouth ; and our trade being once destroyed, we must conclude a peace on the terms they chuse to impose upon us. I am happy to find that such measures have been taken by Government for the defence of that very important place, as leave us no room to fear for it,

When a coup de main only is intended, you must debark as near the object you have in view as possible, because the success depends on secrecy and surprize ; but when you propose to wage war in a country, you are to land your troops at a distance, that you may have time to bring your stores on shore, fortify a camp, take some capital position, and then proceed gradually towards the point you have in view. General O'Reilly, in his expedition against Algier, adopted another mode, and failed in the enterprize ; he
lost

lost great part of his army, and his reputation as an officer.

Next to Plymouth, the only place which can serve the purpose of the enemy, is Portsmouth. It has two fine roads, St. Helen and Spithead, and a very safe harbour. The town and the dock on the land side are fortified, and cannot be taken without a regular siege, the undertaking of which is very difficult, though we had no ships to defend it. The Island of Portsea lies very low, and does not furnish the necessary materials to carry on the works required on such occasions. The enemy must occupy Gosport with part of his army, while the remainder carries on the siege; and if we are masters of Portsdown, and can confine him to the island, we are always able to succour the place, and force him to retire, which he would find no easy matter. The lines of Gosport are of no use, and those towards Portsdown
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are against us, if the invader is in the island, being calculated only to stop an enemy coming from Portsmouth, which I presume he will never be permitted to occupy. The lines of Gosport are equally imperfect; a good fort should be raised on a rising ground, a few hundred yards off, which would render it impossible for the enemy to attempt any thing on that side. In case he should ever land in the island of Portsea, a few redoubts must also be added before the front of the works which cover the dock, to prevent his approaching near enough to throw shells into the dock, which he might now do, as those works are not advanced far enough into the country; an unreasonable respect for private property having occasioned their being kept too far back.

When I considered at first the position of the Isle of Wight, I thought that an enemy might occupy it, and with
fifteen

fifteen or twenty thousand men keep possession of the whole ground ; but having lately examined it with proper attention, I believe now that it is absolutely impossible. This island runs from East to West, and is generally intersected with very high mountains, whose basis run quite to the shore. On the South side of the island they rise by ranges, like an amphitheatre, almost perpendicular, forty or fifty feet high, and the summits, excepting in very few places, to above a thousand ; so that if any troops are posted on them, there is no possibility of landing. The only place where it is less difficult is in Brading Bay, opposite St. Helen's Road. This is a small creek between two very high hills, which being occupied, will prevent a landing. On the South side is a bay, where the shore is low, and very proper for debarking troops ; but Sandown Fort defends that bay very well. From thence to the westernmost point and the Needles, no place is found
where

where a landing can be attempted, if there is the least opposition: Besides the coast is so open and dangerous, that a boat, much less a fleet, cannot lay at anchor an hour without the utmost risk of perishing. From the Needles to Ride you may land any where, and a fleet may anchor in safety, there being a sufficient depth of water for men of war to come through the Needles, and all the way up to Spithead. The channel between the Needles and Hurst Castle is narrow, but it is safe for the largest vessels. The Castle does not seem sufficiently strong against ships of force; but if two considerable batteries were erected on the two points which project into the sea opposite the fortrefs, I believe that pass would be perfectly secured.

Though the difficulties which occur in landing on the South side of the Isle of Wight and indeed of approaching it, seem insurmountable, yet if no
 oppo-

opposition is made, it might be effected; however, if we consider the extent of the island, the great number of very high mountains, and of places to land from our side, it will appear that twenty thousand men would not be able to occupy it in such a manner as to prevent our taking it from them. They must fortify all the shore opposite the New Forest, as well as all the downs or mountains behind them; for there is no one spot on the whole island where the most extensive fortrefs could, in any degree, secure the possession of it to the French. If it is placed on the South shore there is neither bay nor harbour; and by our occupying some neighbouring mountains the garrison would be starved in it. The same difficulty will occur, if placed in the centre, or on the Northern shore, as Cowes, Yarmouth, &c. from whence I conclude, that while England exists as a nation, an enemy cannot keep
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the Isle of Wight a month, though there were thirty thousand men in it.

From Portsmouth to Harwich there is no harbour or road which can, in any degree, answer the purposes of an enemy who intends to land a considerable army, and make war in the country. The difficulty, though very great, does not consist in debarking forty thousand men; it is also necessary, as I have already demonstrated, that they should have a commodious and safe harbour, a place of arms, and be so situated as to keep a sure and easy communication with France, especially with Brest. Such a place is not to be found on the whole coast, except Plymouth and Portsmouth, of which enough has been said already. The Dutch fleet, they say, came up the river very well; but how long did they remain there? A few hours only. Consider, besides the great difference there is between coming from the coast of
Holland

Holland with twenty men of war to make a ridiculous bravado, which lasted twenty-four hours, or coming from Brest with a fleet and four or five hundred transports to invade us, and carry on a war into the heart of our country. The one is easy, the other impracticable.

Though I am convinced such an attempt neither will, nor can be made, in Suffex, Kent, or higher up: I don't think it impossible, that in order to facilitate the operations of their main army, the enemies may threaten different and distant parts of the coast; but no solid operation can in my opinion be executed but in the West.

Upon this supposition, it appears, that our troops are too much scattered, and cannot be brought together without a great loss of time, wherever the enemy may land.

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Whenever a tract of country is to be defended, reason points out the necessity of occupying some central positions, with strong corps to the right and left, to stop the enemy till the whole can be collected. *The line we have to defend extends from PLYMOUTH to DOVER.* PORTS DOWN is the central point on that line. I would therefore recommend, that a third part of our army be placed there, another third on HALL DOWN, or *Haldon Hill*, beyond Exeter, and the remainder on THE LIMITS BETWEEN SUSSEX and KENT. If an attempt is made to the Westward, the body encamped at Portsmouth will march thither, and join that on Hall Down, which I suppose instantly in motion where the invasion is attempted. The body placed in Suffex may remain there, and by a movement to the right or left, be any where, as occasion may require, and easily repulse every attempt made on that coast.

Should

Should the enemy land at Plymouth, which I think most probable, for the reasons already assigned; the regiments now there will be able to dispute the ground, until those on Hall Down can come to their assistance; and it does not require twenty four hours march. Opposed in front by the corps at Plymouth, which is covered by the works now raising there, as well as by the natural strength of the country, and attacked in the rear by the troops coming from Hall Down, an enemy, though far superior in number, would find himself greatly embarrassed. Surrounded by the sea, by strong forts, and a stronger country occupied by fifteen or twenty thousand men, without ground sufficiently extensive to form a line, I don't conceive it possible how he could avoid a total overthrow. There is not a spot about Plymouth, if properly occupied, and protected by the most inconsiderable work, but will require a siege to force you,

which cannot be undertaken while you have any body of troops in the neighbourhood.

The same difficulties, and much greater, will occur to an enemy in the island of Portsea; he can neither subsist there, nor from the adjacent country, if we have a camp on Ports Down, and another in the NEW FOREST.

From what we have said, it seems evident that no invasion can take place, until our fleet, intirely drove out of the sea, is forced to hide itself for a considerable time, in some harbour; and that such an invasion cannot be prosecuted with any probability of success, unless the enemy is master of Plymouth or Portsmouth. Let us now proceed to examine, what may be the consequences, in case such an event should happen.

Supposing the enemy is in possession of Plymouth, he cannot remain, there
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for ever; he will, in a short time, be forced to penetrate further into the country, in order to procure supplies of provisions, or abandon his post for want of them. To remain there with any safety, he must occupy and fortify Mount Edgecombe, and the ground behind the King's Brewhouse, as well as all the ground between the Tamar and that branch of the sea which runs under Mr. Parker's garden to the bridge at the three mile stone, coming to London; he should moreover have a body of troops in Mr. Parker's ground. Forty or fifty thousand men would not be sufficient for the purpose, because these being separated by the sea and the Tamar, could not, in case of an attack, support each other; and if one only of them is defeated, the others must fall successively, and in a very short time. The greatest part of the invaders army will naturally be posted between the Tamar and the sea, by the bridge above mentioned, which puts the Dock, Storehouse,

and Plymouth behind them; this distance is near five miles, and requires twenty thousand men to defend it, which they cannot easily do, for the ground rises gradually from the shore to Dartmoor, so that you have every possible advantage in attacking their posts. The most sure method, however, would be to attack the corps placed at Mount Edgecombe, which, being beat, the others must of course be destroyed. Mount Edgecombe is the key of Plymouth, and must be kept with care.

Though the enemies are in possession of all the different posts above mentioned, and have thereby a place of arms and a fine harbour for their fleet, with which, for a time, they may put an entire stop to all our trade and navigation, yet it can only be for a time. The combined fleet cannot always remain there, and the army, consisting of fifty or sixty thousand men, cooped up in such narrow limits, cannot subsist

sist by the supplies brought from France. They must therefore advance into the country or abandon it. The only decisive operation they could execute would be, to leave ten thousand men at Plymouth, and with the remainder proceed directly to Hall Down, between Chudleigh and Exeter, which is about thirty-six miles from Plymouth. This position is very strong, whether it is taken with the front towards Exeter, or towards Plymouth. There is no passing between the enemy's right and the sea; and, by an easy movement on the left, he is in the mountains, through which all the western roads must pass towards Cornwall. By taking this position, the enemy would be master of Devonshire, Cornwall and part of Somersetshire, which would furnish subsistence in abundance, and having Teignmouth and Dartmouth very near, he would also receive from France whatever he wanted. Possessed of these advan-

tages, and having a very strong country easily to be defended, it would become difficult to drive him back ; and while his fleet, destroying our trade, rode triumphant at sea, we should be reduced to accept of any peace he chused to dictate. It is therefore incumbent upon us to post ourselves so, that we may be near enough to prevent an invading army from penetrating into the country, if we cannot hinder it from taking Plymouth. The means and method of doing this, depending chiefly on the nature of the country, I shall therefore give a description of it so far as it relates to military operations.

All countries are either *Open* or *Close*. By an open country, I mean that where an army, or a considerable body of troops, can almost any where find sufficient room to form in, and to act ; consequently by a close country I mean that where an army in the course of many miles cannot find room to form and act in. By
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the word *Defile*, I mean a narrow pass, formed by mountains, hills, forests, rivers, morasses, hedges, &c. where the road is so contracted, that few men only can advance in front. In the first species of country it is evident that superior numbers must prevail, if the troops are equal in goodness, and the commander knows how to avail himself of that superiority ; for this plain reason, that he can bring a greater number of men into action at any given time, and at any given point, than his adversary. Whereas in a close country, number is nothing, and disposition is every thing. In such a country points only can be attacked, and by a given number of men only. So that if you occupy these points, though otherwise much inferior to the enemy, you may bring more men into action than he, and consequently prevail ; besides, these points may be such as to enable you to attack him in front, flank and rear at the same time.

England,

England, in general, is of this last kind ; the western country is not only very hilly, but also, for the most part, full of inclosures. As you come from Exeter towards London, it is so inclosed with hedges and ditches, that for many miles together you do not find ground sufficiently open to form twenty battalions upon ; so that the high road, where an army can alone march, is one continued pass, or defile, winding at the foot of the mountains, or through the inclosures, of which you may see the specimen in *Plate II.* Those mountains and hedges being properly occupied, an enemy cannot advance a step, and if he is once engaged in them, he can never extricate himself out of the narrow labyrinth, and will be forced to lay down his arms.

There are two roads which may be called military roads, from Plymouth to Exeter ; the one passes by Ivey Bridge, Chudleigh, and Ashburton. The other
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by Ivey Bridge, Totnefs, Newton Bushell and over Hall Down to Exeter. On the first road there are but two places, viz. Hall Down, four miles beyond Exeter, and a heath two miles beyond Chudleigh, where any considerable body of men can form upon. The remainder of the road is one continued defile, intersected by mountains, ravins, hedges, and numberless rivulets, besides the Teign and the Dart, which come from Dartmoor and fall into the sea: Though these are not very deep, yet being near the mountains, they are very rapid, and when the rain falls become very dangerous torrents; their beds are full of large stones, and the banks high, so that you can get over them only at the bridges, where the high road passes. The whole country between this road and the sea coast, from Exmouth to Plymouth, is exactly the same, so that an army can march but in one column. If to avoid the difficulties

difficulties which arise from such a disposition, the enemy should separate his forces, and advance in two columns, along the two roads above mentioned; there being no communication by means of cross roads, you may attack either or both columns separately, for they cannot support each other until they come to Hall Down: Nor in all that tract of country is there a single spot where you may not attack the enemy in front, flank and rear, since the road is continually winding round the foot of the hills.

Between the Teign and the Dart the ground is rather more hilly, and more easily defended. There is but one narrow road, which goes from Dartmouth to Newton Bushel, near which the tide flows. A few miles from Dartmouth a branch of it turns off to Totness, and several paths from the towns on the coast, as Torbay, Paynton, &c. come into the main road. However, a body
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of men landing between Dartmouth and Teignmouth, must finally pass through Newton Bushel in their way to Exeter, or through Totness going to Plymouth. There goes likewise from Dartmouth to Plymouth a road over the mountains by Modbury. All these roads are equally difficult, inso-much that no wheel carriages are used by the farmers, who carry in their harvest on horses. The only proper place between Plymouth and Exmouth where ships can approach, are Dartmouth and Teignmouth; but as the entrance is very narrow, and entirely commanded by the mountains, a few battalions would easily prevent a landing.

From Teignmouth, towards Exeter, there runs a very high mountain called Hall Down, or Haldon Hill, already mentioned. The top is a fine plain, where a numerous army might camp and act. All the roads, as I have said, to and from the
West,

West, pass over it; but an army can come upon it only by the two roads, leading from Newton Bushel and Exmouth, both very difficult. On the South side towards the Teign and Newton Bushel, the hill is rapid. On the West side it falls gradually, and forms many small hills, like an amphitheatre; at the bottom is a wide valley, very much inclosed, on the other side of which are high mountains, which rise continually, as you advance westward. On the East side of Hall Down towards the sea are numberless hills, whose basis form very deep ravins; these hills project quite into the sea, which does not admit of any convenient place for landing troops, and is moreover so shallow, that no ships of burthen can approach the shore. Upon the whole, the country from Exeter to Plymouth is so extremely close and difficult, that a few men properly disposed

disposed will stop and ruin a numerous army.

From Exeter, where most of the western roads join, there are but two roads towards Salisbury, which may be practicable for an army; to Axminster there is only one. At this place begin the two, one to the left through Yeovil, Sherborne, Shaftsbury, and over the Downs; the other to the right by Bridport, Dorchester and Blandford, to Salisbury. The first road as far as Shaftsbury is intersected by numberless hills and vallies, extremely close and cultivated, so that an army can march only in one column. There is scarce a spot where you cannot occupy some post across the road to prevent an enemy from advancing, while the hedges on both sides, lined with your infantry, would so embarrass him, that he could neither advance or retire, or indeed make any defence on the ground for want of
room

room to form a line. From Shaftsbury to Salisbury the road passes over a narrow down having on one side a high ridge of mountains, which runs toward Blandford, and Cranbourn chace, and on the other a deep and wide valley very close. This down is also cut by a great number of ravins, so that very often, there is not room to form a single battalion. If the ridge of mountains, and the valley are occupied, no army can proceed on the high road; nor can it be separated into several columns, without exposing them to be beat in detail, as from the nature of the ground they cannot support each other. The road which goes by Bridport is extremely difficult till you are about two miles beyond that place; then the country opening as far as Salisbury, becomes less inclosed, and offers every where ground sufficient to form a numerous army upon, and very proper for a general action, if you are superior in cavalry.

From

From Salisbury two roads go towards London; the first by Andover, Basingstoke, Bagshot, Egham, &c. Near the seven mile stone a branch goes by Stockbridge over some very high hills, and joins it at Basingstoke: this branch passes through an open country, which however being very high, offers many excellent camps. The first is also carried for some miles through an open country; but about Andover, and from thence to Basingstoke, and Hartfordbridge it is very close. The other road goes by Rumsey, Farnham, &c. through a country which is still more close than the former, and in proportion affords greater advantages in attacking the enemy.

It is needless to prosecute this description any further, because I am persuaded, that no army, however numerous, will ever be able to penetrate forty miles into the country, if proper methods are

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taken to oppose it, and if we know how to avail ourselves, of the numberless resources, which may be drawn from the face of the country. And I have no doubt from the known experience, firmness, and abilities of the commander in chief, but that the event, should an invasion take place, will justify the high trust that his Majesty has placed in him, and fully answer the expectations of the public.

The description I have given is exceedingly imperfect, as no map, plan, or drawing, can convey a true military, and adequate idea of any country. The eye alone, and a good one, accustomed to view ground on a grand scale, very different from that of a parade, can do it effectually. I think however, that what I have said, if read with attention, accompanied with the Map annexed, (*Plate 1.*) will shew the lines on which the enemy can act, as well as the advantages

advantages or disadvantages of the country, through which such lines must necessarily pass. The commander in chief, and his officers, upon examining the ground, will easily fix the particular points where to act, while these points, and the motions of the enemy, will shew *how* to act, as circumstances may require.

C H A P. V.

Observations on the Method of ranging the Troops, and of making War, &c.

THE French army has no doubt some advantages over ours : It is composed of old corps which have been accustomed to exercise, and discipline for many years : The officers of the higher ranks have seen service, and many of them have commanded separate corps during the last war. The habit of being united for a long time together, gives them a facility in manœuvring, a consistency and an adherence of parts, if I may so call it, not so easily broke as in new levies ; all which must insure them a great superiority in a plain and open country, and in a general action. In a close country, where the combat is partial, and confined to particular posts, valour and a good disposition will supply in a great measure the defects inherent to new corps.

Though

Though in point of discipline our enemies enjoy some advantages over us, we possess so many over them in every other respect, that, if we avail ourselves of them, there can be no room left to fear the event.

1st, The face of the country forces them to march in one column; and this difficulty alone overbalances almost every other advantage.

2dly, They have but little cavalry, which from the nature of the country may not, if we chuse it, ever have an opportunity of acting.

3dly, They can have no heavy artillery, and not many field pieces, compared to what we can bring into the field.

4thly, They can have no other provisions but what they bring with them, which, however abundant it may seem, will last only for a very short time.

5thly, They can never have a sufficient number of horses and carriages to transport their stores, artillery, baggage, provisions, &c. which will retard their march, so that they cannot advance above a mile or two a day.

6thly, When they proceed from the shore, they can form no magazines in the country, and must be supplied from their original *dépôt*; and when their line of communication is protracted to a certain length, half their army will not be sufficient to escort their convoys, which you may, and must intercept. This will not only retard their progress, but very soon stop them entirely, and force their army to go back. They have but this alternative, to gain a great and decisive victory, or abandon the enterprise. They cannot remain on the spot, in a close country, surrounded by mountains on every side, and those occupied by our troops: and we have nothing to do but to profit of these advantages, and avoid a general action.

7thly,

7thly, They cannot send detachments, or deviate from the great road, without being exposed to certain destruction: Whereas we, availing ourselves of every cross road, and path, can without risk attack their whole line of march, and soon throw it into confusion. They can act on that line only; whereas we can act where, and when we please.

To these natural advantages we may, I think, procure others from a different manner of ranging the troops, and of carrying on the war.

The present mode of ranging the infantry three men deep, armed with muskets only, is subject to many and very great defects.

First, The line becomes too extensive, and is therefore weak; it cannot advance in any ground, particularly in a close one, without the greatest difficulties and delays, contrary to the very principle of military operations, which should be as quick as lightning.

Secondly, It is inadequate to almost every

every purpose of war, as well against infantry as cavalry, and proper only for fighting at a distance. If you approach the enemy, the line is too weak, the arms too short for a flock, and veteran troops will have a decisive superiority. Placed behind entrenchments, hedges, ditches, &c. which naturally offer great advantages, you can make no resistance from the moment the enemy attacks them, so that unless you keep him off by your fire, he penetrates somewhere, and you must abandon the whole, or be taken in flank, and cut to pieces.

To remedy these defects, I humbly propose, that the infantry be ranged four deep, and that the fourth rank be armed with a Pike eleven or twelve feet long, two feet of which must be made of steel, two inches broad, to cut on each side, without any hatchet, or cross bar, that it may easily pass through the hedges. This fourth rank must be composed of the tallest and strongest men.

This

This formation will render the line less extensive, stronger, and much more active, is proper for every operation, and particularly adapted to our country, every where inclosed with hedges and ditches. In a plain, no infantry formed in the usual manner can resist its shock, an instant, or even approach your line, much less if this is placed behind an entrenchment, or hedge. Moreover, if you form a battalion or two into squares, protected by some howitzers on the flank, no cavalry, however brave, can overturn them. The three first ranks protected by a row of Pikes, which project before them at least five feet, will feel the advantage, and soon find their superiority in whatever ground they are attacked, as well as in attacking the enemy :—(*Plate 3.*)—Let an experiment be made, the event will shew the superiority of the method I propose over that now in practice. It is a novelty. Very true; and this novelty will not a little disconcert the enemy.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Order of Battle.

THE order of battle now adopted in Europe is in many respects defective and absurd. The infantry and cavalry formed three deep make the line so very extensive, that it loses all its activity, which is the soul of military manœuvres, and alone can insure success: insomuch that it may be established as an axiom, that the army which moves and marches with the greatest velocity, must, from that circumstance alone, finally prevail. Our military institutions exclude every idea of celerity; hence it is that our victories are never complete and decisive, and that our attacks are reduced to some particular-

articular points, which gained or lost, the battle is over; the enemy retires generally in good order, because from the extent and slowness of our motions we cannot pursue him with any vigour; he occupies some neighbouring hill, and we have to begin again. Moreover, the position of the cavalry in a line on the flanks of the infantry, is such, that it retards the motions of the whole, because none can advance unless the whole line does; besides it cannot from its situation there support the infantry, or be supported by it: the moment is lost before you can bring the cavalry where it is wanted. The reason assigned for placing the cavalry on the flanks is absurd, *viz.* to cover the flanks of the infantry.--- Pray, is not the flank of the cavalry much weaker than that of the infantry? since it cannot in any manner form a flank to protect itself, much less will it protect the flank of the infantry. Three or four battalions, armed with

pikes, and formed into oblong squares, are the only flank which can effectually cover the line against infantry or cavalry, and they must have besides field-pieces, ten or twelve twelve-pounders, and a few howitzers. (*Plate 3.*)

Cavalry must never appear but in the moment it is brought to action, action being the very essence of the cavalry. When the ground, or other circumstances, do not permit you to bring it to action, it must be kept back behind the infantry, whose flanks secured as I propose, have nothing to fear. If you think your line too weak, though it is much stronger than any other formed in the usual way, let every third or fourth battalion in the line be formed into squares, as those in the flanks, and be assured nothing can resist their efforts, much less overturn and break the line.

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In the manner our line is now formed, not a third of the army is engaged, and that successively; so that numbers are of no use, and only serve to retard its motions, and increase the expence. To remedy these defects I would humbly propose, that all the infantry be formed in such a manner, that between each battalion, or regiment an interval of one hundred and fifty yards be left; behind these intervals I would have the cavalry placed in two lines at a proper distance, each squadron separately, with intervals to manœuvre upon. (*Ptate 3.*)

The first advantage resulting from this disposition is, that you may extend your line to any length, without any danger. The second, that you bring the whole into action at once, and though the enemy be double the number, you may out-flank him, and are in reality stronger than him, for you attack his whole front with superior forces. The third,

that the motions of the whole line are more rapid, as each regiment or battalion moves and acts by itself ; and though some may be more advanced than others, no inconvenience can arise from it, because if the enemy is imprudent enough to break his line to attack such advanced battalion, upon the right and left, he will find those formed into squares to take him on both flanks ; and if he advances a certain length out of his line, you order your battalion to stop, or even retire *à la débâchée*, and in that instant you order some of your squadrons to move forwards thro' the intervals, full gallop, and charge pell-mell, as one horseman acting in this manner has more real activity than seventy who advance and attack in a line as usual. I saw once three hundred horse attack a column of seven or eight thousand foot in this way, which they defeated and dispersed in three or four minutes. The fourth advantage is, that
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if your line is broke in some places, the enemy cannot avail himself of the disorder, because your cavalry advances, and gives the infantry time to recover. The fifth, that if your infantry breaks that of the enemy in any point, then advance your first line of cavalry to attack and disperse it, the whole moving forwards rapidly at the same time, which will infallibly produce a general slaughter, and your victory is complete and decisive. The last advantage of this order of battle, which I shall mention, is, that it is *general*, and equally adapted to every species of country, when an army can act in the least. In an open country you combine the action of cavalry, with that of the infantry, and heavy artillery. In a close country, where an extensive line cannot be formed, the original formation of the troops enables you to act separately, as the ground may require, by corps, detachments, brigades,

gades, or regiments, and that always with superior vigour and activity. It is peculiarly adapted to our country ; I hope, therefore, it will be received and applied on the present occasion.

C H A P. VII.

Of the general Method of making War.

OUR armies, however numerous, are united in one body formed in two or three lines. Between this army and that of the enemy, at a certain distance, the light troops, very often amounting to twenty thousand men, form another army, which is called a chain to observe the enemy, prevent his coming upon you unawares, and cover the march of the grand army. Sometimes also detachments of them are sent to escort your convoys, or to cover a certain district, while the army acts on another line. These light troops, though very numerous, they consider only as mere scouts to observe the

the enemy, infomuch that on a day of battle they are not to be found, and seldom or ever take part in the action. Whether you advance to the enemy, or the enemy comes to you, the light troops difperfe to the right and left, and you hear no more of them till the next day. Why on fuch occasions they do not form to the right and left of the army, at a convenient diftance, and attack the enemy on the flanks, is to me as inconceivable, as the ufe now made of them appears ridiculous and abfurd. Four or five hundred men, including one hundred huffars, diftributed into fmall parties in the woods, behind the hedges, near the high roads, would obferve the enemy much better than ten thoufand men. The motions of fuch a body as that of an army of light troops, are too flow, and always before the eyes of the enemy, fo that he can mark them, and make fome capital manœuvres without your knowledge. Whereas a chain of
fmall

small parties going every where, unite or disperse in a moment, and are always invisible, so that it is impossible for the enemy to make any kind of movement without your having timely notice.

The great defect of the present method of acting is, that however numerous your army may be, if it is formed in one body, your motions are extremely slow. Secondly, the enemy may direct his march so that he outflanks you. Thirdly, you must have a great body of troops between you and him to watch his motions. Fourthly and finally, by marching against him in a line whose direction is perpendicular to his front, you cannot out-flank him. To remedy these very capital defects, I would beg leave to propose another mode of distributing the troops of which our army is composed.

In

In order to explain what I have to say on this subject, I must premise, First, that a man or body of men, as an army, can defend themselves only in front; consequently, if you can attack them on either, or both flanks, you will easily beat them, and much more so if you come upon them in the rear. Hence it is that Nature points out the danger, and raises that *Panic* with which an army is seized when the men apprehend that they are attacked in the rear; conscious of their weakness, they generally fly in confusion. Sometimes the face of the country obliges an enemy to contract his front, as when he comes upon you in columns: then the moment is favourable to attack him, before he has time to form his line. Sometimes by your throwing up some Redoubts* before

* I must observe here that a body of men will raise a sufficient number of Redoubts to cover themselves in eight hours; and that they will compleat the work in six, if they are provided with fascines or faggots.

your

your front, (*Plate 3*) he is obliged to break his line, and to advance in columns: this likewise is an occasion to attack him with advantage. Both are, however, too generally neglected. Men for the most part fix on a given spot to fight, which they will not quit, though the enemy in his progress gives many opportunities to a successful attack. They make their arrangements on paper, and by the slowness of their movements abide by them, being utterly unable to form and execute new dispositions, as circumstances may require.

Besides the circumstances just mentioned, which *force an enemy* to contract his front, there is a method of extending yours, so that you may always out-flank him, though he be much superior in number. If you can *form on a portion of a circle*, whose branches project beyond his flanks, and the enemy persists in advancing within that circle,

or

or remains in a line as usual, while you extend yours in a curve, so that you come on either, or both his flanks, it is evident that if you attack him in that disposition, he must be beat (*Plate 3.*) I therefore propose that your army be divided always in five parts, three placed in the centre, one fifth on the right, the remaining fifth on the left, and each advanced more or less, as the nature of the ground permits. They must not be behind the enemy, and liable to be cut off, as happened to the Prussians at Maxen, unless the whole of your army is opposed to the enemy's flank ; then indeed you may place one or both corps nearly behind him, if the ground is advantageous. They must however, wherever posted, have some certain and secure retreat, otherwise you expose them to great risk, and perhaps to utter ruin and destruction.

The

The advantages arising from this distribution of the troops are many. First, In whatever ground you act it is equally applicable. Secondly, The motions of the whole army are more simple and quicker. Thirdly, The enemy can make no manœuvres without your knowledge. Fourthly, Whether he advances to the right or left, (for he cannot without exposing his army to the most imminent danger, advance against your centre,) your corps, which he is attacking, may fall back, or be supported by the centre, while the other attacks the flank opposite to it. If the enemy keeps his ground and waits your attack, then you act against both his flanks at the same time ; or by lengthening your line to the right or left, enclose his flank while you attack his front. In short, while you can force him to act within a portion of a circle, the victory is yours. This method, I repeat it, is general, equally proper for all cases ; but more particu-

larly advantageous, and even necessary for a defensive war.

Every army acts upon two lines, that on which it stands, and that which is drawn from the post it occupies, to the province it means to cover, or the places from whence it draws its subsistences. An army acting offensively, departs from a given point where its *dépôts* are lodged, and goes to a given point in the enemy's country. It is often and indeed generally adviseable for those on the defensive to avoid a battle; because the consequences are, or may be fatal. But it does not follow that you are to remain inactive: what is then to be done? The answer is obvious. The centre must occupy some advantageous post, strongly fortified, while the two corps or wings must act day and night on the enemy's line of operations. If this is executed with vigour, he will soon be reduced to the necessity of attacking your centre, which you may
avoid

avoid by taking a new position, and gain time or wait for it, while the two wings attack his flanks during the action; or else he must fall back to be nearer his *depôts*, or finally send strong corps against yours; and as these retire not on your army, he loses his time and labour. By this disposition of your troops you cover your country effectually, and prevent the enemy from advancing towards your centre. The further he advances the more danger he runs; for his line of operations will be the longer and the less easy to be guarded. If, on the contrary, you act offensively, the enemy may find a thousand strong camps, from whence you cannot force him by any attack on his front; but if you act by corps, as I propose, and direct your march on either flank, which enables you to act on his line of operation, you will in a few days force him to abandon his camp, and fight you on your own terms, or abandon the country. If he

permits you to approach him, you may not only force him to abandon the country, but oblige him to retire in a given direction. I do not therefore understand a General where he says, the enemy was posted in such a manner that he could not be forced. I admit it could not perhaps be done by attacking his front ; but unless his subsistence grows under his feet, he may be forced to abandon any camp, if you act on his flanks and line of operation, which he cannot prevent but by taking another position.

The march of an army is justly considered as one of the most capital operations in the art of war ; I shall therefore beg leave to point out the principles on which it is to be formed.

First, That it be executed in the least time possible.

Secondly,

Secondly, That the columns may be formed into a line with the greatest facility.

It follows from hence, that if the whole line, or lines, could march in front from one camp to another, this would be the most perfect way of marching, because no time would be lost in forming the columns for the march, or in replacing them in a line. Every officer will conceive that I mean a common march, when you advance in front towards the enemy : for if you move on his flanks, you have nothing to do but to make the army, as it stands in two or three lines, march on its right or left ; then you are in order of battle, by a simple movement to the right or left, on the ground where you stand. But as no country is sufficiently open for an army to advance in a line, for any considerable distance, you must of course break that line, and march in several columns. The more numerous these
columns

columns are, the better for the reasons above mentioned. The worst of all consequently, is that when you can march in one column only, because it supposes the whole army is in a defile, and exposed to be cut in pieces by very few men, who occupy the ground through which such a column is passing. This must be the case with the French, if they attempt to penetrate into this country, as appears from the description we have given of it.

F I N I S.

The MILITARY ROADS from PLYMOUTH to LONDON.

PLYMOUTH.	Dist. in Miles.			Dist. in Miles.	
	betw. places	from Plym.		betw. places	from Plym
To Ridgeway	$5\frac{1}{4}$	$5\frac{3}{4}$			
Lemin Bridge	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$7\frac{3}{4}$			
Woodland	$2\frac{1}{4}$	10			
IVY BRIDGE.	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$11\frac{1}{2}$	IVY BRIDGE to		
Wrangalin	$3\frac{1}{2}$	15	Wonton	$5\frac{3}{4}$	$17\frac{1}{4}$
Brent	$1\frac{1}{4}$	16	Totnefs	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$21\frac{1}{2}$
Harburton	$2\frac{3}{4}$	19	Newton Buskel	$11\frac{1}{2}$	33
Dean	$2\frac{3}{4}$	$21\frac{3}{4}$	Red Lyon	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$35\frac{1}{2}$
Buckford	$\frac{1}{4}$	22	HALL DOWN	$6\frac{1}{2}$	42
Ashburton	3	25	Kenford	2	44
Beckington	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$28\frac{1}{4}$	Alphington	$2\frac{1}{2}$	46
Chudleigh	5	$33\frac{1}{4}$	EXETER	$1\frac{1}{2}$	48
Shillingford	$7\frac{3}{4}$	41			
EXETER	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$43\frac{1}{2}$	EXETER to		
Honiton Clyft	4	47	Heavy Tree	1	$44\frac{1}{2}$
Rochbere	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$49\frac{1}{2}$	Bishops Clyft	$3\frac{1}{2}$	48
Honiton Bridge	$6\frac{1}{2}$	56	Newton Poplar	$7\frac{1}{2}$	$55\frac{1}{2}$
Honiton	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$59\frac{1}{2}$	Sidford	$2\frac{1}{2}$	58
Offwell	$3\frac{1}{2}$	63	Cullyford	$7\frac{1}{2}$	$65\frac{1}{2}$
AXMINSTER	6	69	Lyme	$6\frac{1}{2}$	72
Ford	2	71	Shaderton	2	74
Street	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$75\frac{1}{4}$			
Crewkherne	$6\frac{3}{4}$	82	Chidiok	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$78\frac{1}{2}$
Hailbeer	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$84\frac{1}{2}$	Bridport	$2\frac{1}{2}$	81
East Chirnock	$2\frac{1}{2}$	87			
West Coker	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$88\frac{1}{2}$	Stapleton	10	91
Yeovil	3	$91\frac{1}{2}$	DORCHESTER	5	96
Babylon Hill	1	$92\frac{1}{2}$			
Sherborn	$4\frac{1}{2}$	97	Piddle River	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$100\frac{1}{2}$
Milborn Port	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$99\frac{1}{2}$			
Stour West-over	$6\frac{1}{2}$	106	Milford	4	$104\frac{1}{2}$
Stour East-over	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$108\frac{1}{2}$			
Shaftsbury	4	$112\frac{1}{2}$	Blandford	8	$112\frac{1}{2}$
Ludwell	1	$113\frac{1}{2}$			

The Military Roads from PLYMOUTH to LONDON.

	Dist. in Miles.			Dist. in Miles.	
	betw. places	from Plym		betw. places	from Plym.
White Street Hill	4	117 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Fovent Hut	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	121	Woodyates Inn	12 $\frac{3}{4}$	125 $\frac{1}{4}$
Over the Plain by the Race Ground	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	126 $\frac{1}{2}$	Coombe	8	133 $\frac{1}{4}$
Mount Harman Hill	3	129 $\frac{1}{2}$			
SALISBURY.	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	131 $\frac{3}{4}$	SALISBURY.	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	136 $\frac{3}{4}$
St. Thomas's Bridge	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	135			
The Hut	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	138 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Lobcock's Corner	2	140 $\frac{1}{2}$	Lobcock's Corner to		
Middle Wallop	2	142 $\frac{1}{2}$	Stockbridge	7	147 $\frac{1}{2}$
Andover	7	149 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sutton	7	154 $\frac{1}{2}$
Hutborn	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	153 $\frac{3}{4}$	Cranburn	1	155 $\frac{1}{2}$
Whitchurch	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	156 $\frac{1}{2}$	The Three Burrows	3	158 $\frac{1}{2}$
Overton	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	160	Popham Lane	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	162
Wotton	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	165 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Basingstoke	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	168	Basingstoke	6	168
Newnham	4	172			
Hook	1	173	SALISBURY to		
Murrel Green	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	174 $\frac{1}{2}$	Alderbury	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	135 $\frac{1}{2}$
Hartley Row	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	178	Whaddon	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	136 $\frac{1}{4}$
Hartford Bridge	1	179	White Parish	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	139 $\frac{3}{4}$
Blackwater	5	184	Cows Field Gr.	1	140 $\frac{3}{4}$
Golden Farmer	3	187	Heath Post	6	146 $\frac{3}{4}$
Bagshot	1	188	Rumsey	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	149
Bagshot Heath	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	191 $\frac{1}{2}$	Enfield	4	153
New England Inn	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	193 $\frac{1}{4}$	Hursley	2	155
Egham	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	196 $\frac{1}{2}$	Pitt	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	155 $\frac{3}{4}$
Staines Turnpike	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	197 $\frac{3}{4}$	WINCHESTER.	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	157
Staines	1	198 $\frac{3}{4}$	Magdalen House	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	158 $\frac{1}{4}$
Belfont	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	202 $\frac{1}{4}$	Sewers Bridge	5	163 $\frac{1}{4}$
The Powder Mills	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	203 $\frac{3}{4}$	Arlesford	1	164 $\frac{1}{4}$
Hownsflow	2	205 $\frac{3}{4}$	Brighton	2	166 $\frac{1}{4}$
Brentford	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	208 $\frac{1}{2}$	Alton	8	174 $\frac{1}{4}$
Turnham Green	2	210 $\frac{1}{2}$	Bentley Green	5	179 $\frac{1}{4}$
Hammermith	1	211 $\frac{1}{2}$	Farnham	4	183 $\frac{1}{4}$
Kenington	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	214	Frimley	8	191 $\frac{1}{4}$
LONDON.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	215 $\frac{1}{2}$	Bagshot	4	195 $\frac{1}{4}$


Military Road from PORTSMOUTH to LONDON.

				Distances in Miles	
				betw. places	from Portf.
PORTSMOUTH to					
Portsea Bridge	-	-		$4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$
Cosham	-	-		$\frac{1}{2}$	5
PORTSDOWN	-	-		$\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$
Purbeck Heath	-	-		2	$7\frac{1}{2}$
Bere Forest	-	-		1	$8\frac{1}{2}$
Harndon	-	-		$2\frac{1}{2}$	11
Petersfield	-	-		$7\frac{1}{2}$	$18\frac{1}{2}$
Sheet Bridge	-	-		1	$19\frac{1}{2}$
Rake	-	-		$5\frac{3}{4}$	$23\frac{1}{4}$
Lippock	-	-		$2\frac{3}{4}$	26
Over the Heath to Hind Head Hill				$5\frac{1}{4}$	$31\frac{1}{4}$
Milford	-	-		$6\frac{1}{4}$	$37\frac{1}{2}$
Godalmin	-	-		$1\frac{1}{2}$	39
Catherine Hill	-	-		3	42
Guildford	-	-		1	43
Ripley	-	-		6	49
Cobham Street	-	-		$4\frac{1}{4}$	$53\frac{1}{4}$
Esher	-	-		$3\frac{1}{4}$	$56\frac{1}{2}$
Thames Ditton	-	-		2	$58\frac{1}{2}$
Kingston	-	-		$2\frac{1}{2}$	61
Putney Heath	-	-		4	65
Wandsworth	-	-		2	67
Newington	-	-		$4\frac{3}{4}$	$71\frac{3}{4}$
LONDON	-	-		$1\frac{3}{4}$	$73\frac{1}{2}$

(90)

Branches between PLYMOUTH and EXETER.


	Dist. in Miles			Dist. in Miles	
	betw. places	from Plym		betw. places	from Plym
PLYMOUTH					
To Buckland	3	3			
Efford	5	3			
Yalmerton Bridge	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Modbury	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	14 $\frac{1}{4}$	Modbury to		
Gary Bridge	5	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	Totnes	11	25 $\frac{1}{4}$
Holwell	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	23	Newton Busbel	11	36 $\frac{1}{4}$
Dartmouth	7	30			
Crapland	2	32			
Come	9	41			
Newton Busbel	5	46			





INCLOSED

the Enemy



GENERAL FACE OF THE COUNTRY

ON THE WESTERN ROADS,

*Chiefly between Plymouth and Exeter.**Engraved by W^m Faden.*

INCLOSED

COUNTRY

the Enemy

MOUNTAINOUS

COUNTRY

The PIKE and the PII

2 Inch

Note
The men
have been
drawn at
a greater
distance
than they
ought to be,
in order to
shew more
clearly their
respective
attitudes



The PIKE and the PIKEMEN

Note
The men
have been
drawn at
a greater
distance
than they
ought to be,
in order to
show more
clearly their
respective
attitudes



The Army formed in a portion of a Circle



The Army formed in a Line,
with Redoubts and Epaulements in Front
and Battalions armed with Pikes on the Flanks.

